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Lowery: Lowery: Don't Get Involved

Don't Get Involved!-How Unsuspecting
Secured Creditors May Incur Liability
under CERCLA by "Participatingin the
Management" of a Debtor's "Facility"
INTRODUCTION

The alarm has sounded in the wake of the Eleventh Circuit's decision in
United States v. FleetFactorsCorp.' Traditionally, lending institutions made

loans based primarily on the credit-worthiness of the borrower.2 They were
concerned with the borrower's type of business, or the type of enterprise the
borrower proposed to start with the borrowed funds. The reason for the
lender's concern, however, was based primarily on economic considerations.'
In short, the lender wanted to' know if the economic situation and the
borrower's abilities in a particular area suggested that the enterprise presented
a sound investment opportunity for use of the lender's financial resources.
The Fleet decision will change the way lenders must look at every loan they
make for fear of incurring substantial environmental liabilities for hazardous
waste clean-up costs.4 This Comment will examine the impact of Fleet on
lender liability under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA), commonly known as "Superfund. '5 The

focus of this Comment is not limited to situations traditionally thought of as

"Environmental Law." Rather, this Comment seeks to illustrate that a new

1. 901 F.2d 1550 (11th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 59 U.S.L.W. 3481 (U.S. Jan. 14,
1990) (No. 90-504).
2. See Corash and Behrendt, LenderLiability Under CERCLA: Searchfor a Safe

Harbor,43 S.W. LJ. 863, 864 (1990) ("In simple terms, the customary risk taken by
lenders in making a loan is a credit risk: the borrower may not have the economic
resources to repay the loan.").
3. See Burcat, Environmental Liability of Creditors: Open Season on Banks,
Creditors,and OtherDeepPockets, 103 BANKING L.J. 509,510 (1986) ("Most likely,

these creditors have never considered environmental liability when making loans,
assisting a financially troubled debtor, or foreclosing on a defaulted debt.").
4. This exposure is evidenced by several recent cases, in addition to Fleet,holding
lenders liable for environmental cleanup costs where the lender at least initially, simply
had entered into a creditor-debtor relationship as a secured party. See, e.g., Guidice
v. BFG Electroplating and Mfg. Co., Inc., 732 F. Supp. 556 (W.D. Pa. 1989); United
States v. Maryland Bank & Trust Co., 632 F. Supp. 573 (D. Md. 1986); United States
v. Mirabile, 15 Envtl. L Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20 (E.D. Pa. 1985).
5. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-57 (1988).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1991
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and important variable, environmental liability, exists and must be considered
each time a loan is made.
In this Comment, the meaning and importance of one key phrase found
in the Superfund statute, "participating in the management of a... facility,"
will be examined.6 The meaning of this short statutory phrase, and its
interpretation by other federal courts, will determine the degree to which
lenders are exposed to Superfund liability after Fleet. As a result of that
decision, a secured creditor will have participated in the management of a
facility and will thus be liable for environmental cleanup costs under
Superfund when "its involvement with the management of the facility is
sufficiently broad to support an inference
that it could affect hazardous waste
7
disposal decisions if it so chose."
The first section of this Comment will outline briefly the Superfund
statute and its provisions that are pertinent to the lender liability issue.
Section II presents the facts of Fleet, and discusses the reasoning of the
district court below.8 Section I describes the reasoning of the court of
appeals and the policy considerations it relied on in reaching its result. In
Section IV, the Comment examines the implications of Fleet on the lender
liability issue, and discusses possible alternative "participating in the
management" standards. These alternatives continue to be important to
understanding the entire area of secured creditor liability under Superfund
since several district courts outside the Eleventh Circuit have declined to
extend Superfund liability as far as the Fleet court's holding would suggest.
Therefore, it is quite possible that a more limited view of potential secured
party liability may still gain acceptance in one or more circuits as additional
litigation in this area progresses.9 Section V highlights in detail why Fleet

6. Id. § 9601(20)(A).
7. Fleet, 901 F.2d at 1558 (emphasis added). The Fleet court was the first

appellate court to define specifically this statutory phrase. Note the broad, sweeping
language employed by the court-"inference" and "could affect" hazardous waste
disposal. See Sections IV and V of this Comment, infra, for a detailed discussion of

the court's definition.
8. As discussed infra, the district court's analysis was based at least in part on

Mirabile. See supra note 4 and accompanying text. Since only the Eleventh Circuit
has passed on the precise question presented in Fleet, it certainly is possible that other
circuits may decide to adopt a standard more akin to that adopted in Mirabile, and by

the district court. See Section II.B. of this Comment, infra, for a discussion of the
district court's reasoning.
9. For example, a recent Ninth Circuit decision indicated that if confronted with
the precise issue presented in Fleet, the Ninth Circuit would not be willing to extend
liability as far as the Eleventh Circuit did in Fleet. More significantly, the Ninth
Circuit specifically stated that "there must be some actual management of the facility"
before Superfund liability will be imposed. In re Bergsoe Metal Corp., 910 F.2d 668,
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol56/iss2/4
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undermines a central goal of the Superfund statute: promoting safe hazardous
waste practices.10 Finally, Section VI will review briefly the reactions of the
United States government, including the Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) and some members of Congress, to the Fleet decision.
I. THE CERCLA STATUTORY SCHEME
Superfund was enacted in 1980 in response to the perceived need to close
the many statutory loopholes found in several other federal environmental
laws.' The statute authorizes the federal government to respond to and
clean up hazardous waste sites and spills.12 In general, the federal government conducts the clean up activities following guidelines set forth in the
National Contingency Plan (NCP)," and the government may then recover

672 (9th Cir. 1990). This indication was pure dictum, however, since the Ninth Circuit
did not specifically decide the proper meaning of "participating in the management of
.. a facility." Id.
Despite the fact that the Ninth Circuit's language was pure
dictum, the banking industry welcomed the decision. See, e.g., Kleege, Banks
Welcome CourtRuling for EnvironmentalCleanups,AM. BANKER, Aug. 22, 1990, at

30 ("'If I were a lender, I'd feel a whole lot better after this [the Bergsoe] decision,'
said liability lawyer Edward F. Mannino .....
10. See infra note 151.
11. See State of New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1040 (2d Cir.

1985) ("CERCLA was designed 'to bring order to the array of partly redundant, partly
inadequate federal hazardous substances cleanup and compensation laws."') (quoting
F. ANDERSON, D. MANDELKER, & A. TARLOCK, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECnON: LAW
AND PoIucY 568 (1984)). See also Note, When a Security Becomes a Liability:
ClaimsAgainst Lenders in Hazardous Waste Cleanup, 38 HASTINGS L.J. 1261, 1263

(1987) ("Congress enacted CERCLA... to close the gaps in federal hazardous waste
laws.").
12. 42 U.S.C. § 9604(a)(1) (1988) provides in pertinent part:

Whenever (A) any hazardous substance is released or there is a
substantial threat of such a release into the environment, or (B) there is a
release or substantial threat of release into the environment of any pollutant
or contaminant which may present an imminent and substantial danger to
the public health or welfare, the President is authorized to act, consistent

with the national contingency plan, to remove or arrange for the removal
of, and provide for remedial action relating to such hazardous substance,
pollutant, or contaminant at any time (including its removal from any
contaminated natural resource), or take any other response measure
consistent with the national contingency plan which the President deems
necessary to protect the public health or welfare or the environment ....
13. This plan, prepared pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 9605 (1988), "governs cleanup
efforts by 'establish[ing] procedures and standards for responding to releases of
hazardous substances."' State of N. Y. v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1041
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1991
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the costs incurred through legal action against responsible parties. 4
Superfund also allows recovery by private individuals who incur response
costs s and who otherwise comply with the requirements of the NCP.16
Liability is imposed under Superfund pursuant to section 9607(a),"7
which sets forth four classes of persons 8 who may incur liability. 9 As is
(2d Cir. 1985) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 9605 (1988)).
14. Shore Realty, 759 F.2d at 1041. The Superfund originally was established
through taxes collected over a five-year period on certain petroleum products, other
chemicals, and some general revenue funds. Id. at 1041 n.10.
15. See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(A) (1988) (imposing liability for "response costs"
incurred by the United States or a state on persons liable under 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a));
see also ShoreRealty, 759 F.2d at 1043 ("[S]ection 9607 makes these persons [persons
falling into one of the four categories in 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(1)-(4)] liable, if 'there
is a release, or a threatened release which causes the incurrence of response costs, of
a hazardous substance' from the facility, for, among other things, 'all costs of removal
or remedial action incurred by the United States Government or a State not inconsistent with the national contingency plan.'") (quoting 42 U.S.C. §9607(a)(4)(A) (1988)).
16. Shore Realty, 759 F.2d at 1042.
17. See infra note 19 for the full text of the statute.
18. "The term 'person' means an individual, firm, corporation, association,
partnership, consortium, joint venture, commercial entity, United States Government,
State, municipality, commission, political subdivision of a State, or any interstate
body." 42 U.S.C. § 9601(21) (1988).
19. Section 9607(a) provides:
Liability
(a) Covered persons; scope...
Notwithstanding any other provision or rule of law, and subject only
to the defenses set forth in subsection (b) of this section(1) the owner and operator of a vessel or a facility,
(2) any person who at the time of disposal of any hazardous substance
owned or operated any facility at which such hazardous substances were
disposed of,
(3) any person who by contract, agreement, or otherwise arranged for
disposal or treatment, or arranged with a transporter for transport for
disposal or treatment, of hazardous substances owned or possessed by such
person, by any other party or entity, at any facility or incineration vessel
owned or operated by another party or entity and containing such hazardous
substances, and
(4) any person who accepts or accepted any hazardous substances for
transport to disposal or treatment facilities, incineration vessels or sites
selected by such person, from which there is a release, or a threatened
release which causes the incurrence of response costs, of a hazardous
substance, shall be liable for(A) all costs of removal or remedial action incurred by the
United States Government or a State ...not inconsistent with
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol56/iss2/4
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evident from examining section 9607(a), liability is divided among two types
of "owners" and "operators"20 under subsections one and two, and among
those who transport and dispose of hazardous wastes under subsections three
and four. Any of these four classes of persons may then be held liable for
any of the "response coSts",21 listed in subsection four, subdivisions A
Section 9607(b) also sets forth the defenses available to
through C.
charges of SUperfund liability. An examination of the language of section
9607(b) reveals that the defenses available are very narrow, and leave those
found to be "owners or operators" little room to escape liability. Section
9607(b) provides in pertinent part that potentially liable parties may escape
liability if they can establish that any damages incurred under section 9607(a)
were caused by "an act of God,... an act of war, ... [or] an act or omission
of a third party [under certain limited circumstances]." These limited defenses
are the only avenues available to an owner or-operator as evidenced by the
language of section 9607(a), which provides in pertinent part, "and subject
only to the defenses set forth in subsection (b) of this section."' Absent the
protection of one of these defenses, "Congress intended that responsible parties
be held strictly liable, even though an explicit provision for strict liability was
not included in the compromise. '24
This Comment will focus on potential liability under sections 9607(a)(1)
and (2) since those provisions were the focus of the analysis in the Fleet case

the national contingency plan;
(B) any other necessary costs of response incurred by any
other person consistent with the national contingency plan; or
(C) damages for injury to, destruction of, or loss of natural
resources, including the reasonable costs of assessing such
injury, destruction, or loss resulting from such a release ....
42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1988).
20. See infra notes 26-27 for pertinent provisions of 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(A)
(1988) (CERCLA's owner or operator definition).
21. See supra note 15.
22. See Shore Realty, 759 F.2d at 1043 ("[S]ection 9607 makes these persons
[those listed in subsections (1)-(4)] liable.., for, among other things, 'all costs of
').
removal or remedial action incurred ..
23. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1988) (emphasis added).
24. Shore Realty, 759 F.2d at 1042. The Shore Realty court further explained this
position when it stated:
Section 9601(32) provides that "liability" under CERCLA "shall be
construed to be the standard of liability" under section 311 of the Clean
Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1321, which courts have held to be strict liability
... and which Congress understood to impose such liability ......
Id. at 1042. See also Fleet, 901 F.2d at 1554 (CERCLA imposes strict liability on
owners or operators).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1991
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and because subsections one and two are most relevant to the Superfund
lender liability issue presented in Fleet. 5 Another important provision, for
purposes of this Comment's analysis, is section 9601(20)(A),' defining the
term "owner or operator" and setting forth Superfund's "secured creditor
exemption." 2
II. FACTS OF THE FLEET FACrORS CASE
A. GeneralBackground
The United States filed suit against Fleet Factors Corp. 28 (Fleet) seeking
to impose liability on Fleet under Superfund. The United States sought to
recover the "response costs" 29 incurred by the Environmental Protection

25. See infra Sections II and HI of this Comment.
26. Section 9601(20)(A) states in pertinent part: "The term 'owner or operator'
means... (ii) in the case of an onshore facility or an offshore facility, any person
owning or operating such facility ....

"

42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(A) (1988). The terms

"owner and "operator" are used inconsistently in parts of the CERCLA statutory
scheme. The Court of Appeals in Fleet clarified any potential inconsistency by stating:
Although the "owner and operator" language of § 9607(a)(1) is in the
conjunctive, we construe this language in the disjunctive in accordance with
the legislative history of CERCLA and the persuasive interpretations of
other federal ourts.... Additionally, we note that § 9607(a)(2) is phrased
in the disjunctive. We can perceive no rational explanation, other than
careless statutory drafting, for imposing liability upon "owners oroperators"
under one section but only holding "owners and operators" liable under
another section .... Our construction of both statutory provisions in the
disjunctive is further supported by the fact that the definitional section of
the statute only refers to the phrase "owner or operator."
Fleet,901 F.2d at 1554 n.3 (citations omitted). See also Guidice v. BFG Electroplating and Mfg. Co., Inc., 732 F. Supp. 556, 561 (W.D. Pa. 1989); United States v.
Maryland Bank & Trust Co., 632 F. Supp. 573, 577-78 (D. Md. 1986).
27. Section 9601(20)(A) also sets forth the "secured creditor exemption, which
provides: "Such term [the definition of owner or operator] does not include a person,
who, withoutparticipatingin the rmanagement of a vessel or facility, holds indicia of
ownershipprimarily toprotecthis security interest in the vessel or facility." 42 U.S.C.

§ 9601(20)(A) (1988) (emphasis added). The term "secured lender exemption" or the
"security interest exemption" is used to describe this statutory provision. See Fleet,
724 F. Supp. at 962; Guidice, 732 F. Supp. at 562. For the purposes of this Comment,
this provision will be referred to as the "secured creditor exemption," the term used
by the Fleet court.
28. 724 F. Supp. 955 (S.D. Ga. 1988).
29. See supra note 15.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol56/iss2/4
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Agency (EPA) in cleaning up the hazardous waste ° site. The United States
32
claimed that Fleet was liable as an "owner or operator"'" of a "facility
by participating in the management of the facility despite its status as a
secured creditor to the facility's legal owner.33
Fleet's possible exposure to liability arose in 1976 when Fleet entered
into a "factoring"' agreement with Swainsboro Paint Works, Inc. (SPW).35
The factoring agreement involved several financial transactions, including the

30. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(14) (1988) defines the term "hazardous substance" as
(A) any substance designated pursuant to section 1321(b)(2)(A) of Title 33,
(B) any element, compound, mixture, solution, or substance designated
pursuant to section 9602 of this title, (C) any hazardous waste having the
characteristics identified under or listed pursuant to section 3001 of the
Solid Waste Disposal Act (but not including any waste the regulation of
which under the Solid Waste Disposal Act has been suspended by Act of
Congress), (D) any toxic pollutant listed under section 112 of the Clean Air
Act, ... and (F) any imminently hazardous chemical substance or mixture
with respect to which the Administrator has taken action pursuant to section
2606 of Title 15. The term does not include petroleum, including crude oil
or any fraction thereof which is not otherwise specifically listed or
designated as a hazardous substance under subparagraphs (A) through (F)
of this paragraph, and the term does not include natural gas, natural gas
liquids, liquefied natural gas, or synthetic gas usable for fuel (or mixtures
of natural gas and such synthetic gas).
There was no dispute in this litigation over whether the chemicals in question here fell
within the definition of a hazardous substance.
31. See supra notes 26-27.
32. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(9) (1988) defines the term facility as
(A) any building, structure, installation, equipment, pipe or pipeline
(including any pipe into a sewer or publicly owner treatment works), well,
pit, pond, lagoon, impoundment, ditch, landfill, storage container, motor
vehicle, rolling stock, or aircraft, or (B) any site or area where a hazardous
substance has been deposited, stored, disposed of, or placed, or otherwise
came to be located; but does not include any consumer product in consumer
use or any vessel.
33. Fleet, 724 F. Supp. at 960. See supra notes 26-27 for'the text of the secured
creditor exemption.
34. Factoring is defined as the "[s]ale of accounts receivable of a firm to a factor
at a discounted price. The purchase of accounts receivable from a business by a factor
who thereby assumes the risk of loss in return for some agreed discount." BLACK'S
LAW DIcTIONARY 532 (5th ed. 1979).
35. Fleet, 724 F. Supp. at 957. SPW was owned wholly by Clifford Horowitz
and Murray Newton who were also named as defendant's in this action. SPW had
been, and was at the time the factoring agreement was executed, operating a cloth
printing facility. Id.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1991
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main part of the agreement where Fleet advanced funds to SPW in exchange
for an assignment of SPW's accounts receivable.' "Fleet also obtained a
security interest in all of SPW's equipment, inventory and fixtures" as
collateral for the cash advances.3 7 In addition, SPW granted Fleet a security
interest in the SPW plant.'
The factoring agreement continued until August 1979, when SPW filed

for bankruptcy under Chapter 11.'9 Fleet's relationship with SPW continued,
however, as Fleet advanced further funds to SPW under a court-approved
factoring agreement after the Chapter 11 filing.4 In late 1980 or early 1981,
Fleet notified SPW that it would no longer advance any funds under the
factoring agreement because SPW's account balance exceeded Fleet's estimate
of the worth of SPW's accounts receivable.41 As a result, SPW ceased
operations in February 1981.42 After the Chapter 11 proceeding was
converted to Chapter 7, SPW was adjudicated a bankrupt under Chapter 743
of the bankruptcy code in December 1981. 44
During the Chapter 11 reorganization, Fleet continued to conduct dealings
with SPW. Fleet continued collecting the assigned accounts receivable and
conducted credit checks of SPW customers before SPW shipped any
remaining goods. 45 After SPW entered Chapter 7 proceedings, Fleet obtained
court approval and in May 1982, foreclosed its security interest in some of
SPW's inventory and equipment and contracted with Baldwin Industrial
Liquidator's, Inc. (Baldwin) to conduct an auction to dispose of the inventory
and equipment.' 6 On June 22, 1982, Baldwin sold some of this equipment
at a public auction "as is," leaving the removal of the purchased items up to
the purchasers. 47

36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1174 (1988).
40. Fleet, 724 F. Supp. at 957.
41. Id. at 958.
42. Id. at 957-58.
43. 11 U.S.C. §§ 701-766 (1988).
44. A trustee was appointed to take title to SPW's property and to supervise the
liquidation of SPW's assets. Fleet, 724 F. Supp. at 958.
45. Id. SPW continued to operate after entering Chapter 11 as it wound up its
affairs and disposed of the twenty to twenty-five million yards of cloth left at the
facility. As discussed infra in Section I1, infra, the government alleged even greater
involvement on Fleet's part during this time period.
46. Fleet did not foreclose on. its security interest in SPW's real property. Id. at
957.
47. Id. at 958.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol56/iss2/4
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Approximately two months after the auction, on August 31, 1982, Fleet
contracted with Nix Riggers (Nix).4 Nix, an industrial liquidator, was hired
to remove the residual equipment and inventory and agreed to "leave the
premises in 'broom clean' condition. ''49 Nix finished its work in December
of 1983.50 Subsequently, on July 7, 1987, a tax foreclosure sale was held and
the property was conveyed to Emanuel County, Georgia.5'
Fleet's legal problems began when the United States filed suit against it
on July 9, 1987.' The United States did not dispute any of the foregoing
facts.53 It did dispute, however, the events surrounding Baldwin's auction
and claimed that Baldwin moved over four hundred rotting and leaking drums
containing chemicals and dyes away from the auction floor before the sale.54
The United States further contended that when Nix was cleaning out the
remaining equipment, it disturbed asbestos-containing pipe insulation attached
to the machines and released hazardous asbestos fibers into the air.55 On
January 20, 1984, the EPA inspected the SPW facility and found seven
hundred fifty-five gallon drums containing toxic chemicals.56 In February

1984 the EPA initiated a response to clean up these chemicals after finding
that an immediate threat to the public health and environment was posed.57
The EPA took further action after determining that the asbestos problem posed
a serious environmental threat by conducting additional cleanup activities in
June 1984. The total cost of these cleanup operations was alleged to be
nearly $400,000."9
The United States argued that Fleet, while not an "owner" in terms of
holding legal title to the SPW facility, nevertheless conducted activities at the
facility which rose to the level of "participating in the management of" the

48. Id.
49. Id. Nix's contract called for them to complete the job in up to 180 days with
a provision in the contract for extending the time period by subsequent agreement.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 957. The sale resulted from SPW's failure to pay its state and local
property taxes.
52. Id. at 960.
53. Id. at 958.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 959.
57. Id. The EPA has promulgated regulations governing such response activities.
These regulations are codified at EPA Hazardous Substances Response Guidelines, 40
C.F.R. §§ 300.61-.71 (1989).
58. Fleet, 724 F. Supp. at 958
59. Id.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1991
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Thus, the United States
facility sufficient to impose Superfund liability.'
contended, Fleet was not entitled to rely on Superfund's secured61creditor
exemption as a basis for exculpating itself from Superfund liability.
Fleet contended that it simply was involved in this situation by virtue of
its security interests in SPW's equipment, inventory and facility and thus fell
within Superfund's statutory secured creditor exemption.6 2 Fleet also
disputed the United States' allegations that Baldwin moved any drums, and
further challenged the United States about the asbestos release, claiming that
the United States had no evidence that the insulation around the pipes
contained asbestos.6 Fleet further contended that even if the EPA did incur
costs in disposing of hazardous wastes, the disposal of such wastes took place
before Fleet foreclosed on SPW's equipment and inventory. 64 Therefore,
Fleet argued, it could not be liable as an owner or operator of a facility at the
time of disposalof any hazardous wastes,6 nor could it be liable as an owner
or operator of the facility immediately before the tax foreclosure conveyed
title to the county.6
B. The District Court's Opinion67

The district court, after reviewing the Superfund statute and relevant case
law, first found that three elements must be established by the plaintiff to
prevail under Superfund: the plaintiff must show that "(1) [d]efendant falls
within one or more of the classes of liable persons described in 42 U.S.C.
9607(a)()-(4)'... ; (2) [a] 'release' or 'threatened release' of a 'hazardous
substance' has occurred or is occurring; and (3) [t]he release or threatened
release has caused the United States to incur 'response costs." '68 The court

60. Id. at 960.
61. Id.
62. United States v. Fleet Factors Corp., 901 F.2d 1550, 1560 (11th Cir. 1990),
cerl denied, 59 U.S.LW. 3481 (U.S. Jan. 14, 1991) (No. 90-504). See supra notes
25-26 for the full text of the secured creditor exemption.
63. Fleet, 901 F.2d at 1560 n.14.
64. Id.
65. See supra note 19 for the text of § 9607(a)(2) which imposes liability on the
owner or operator at the time of the hazardous waste disposal.
66. See infra note 79 and accompanying text for a discussion of the liability of
the owner or operator of the facility immediately before the lawsuit is commenced
where the facility has, at the time of suit, been acquired by a governmental body.
67. This opinion involves the district court's disposition of the United States'
motion for partial summary judgment on the issue of liability against Fleet, Horowitz
and Newton. Fleet, 724 F. Supp. at 957.
68. Id. at 959 (citing Shore Realty, 759 F.2d at 1043-48).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol56/iss2/4
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then noted that the real dispute in this case was not whether a release or
threatened release of a hazardous substance occurred, or whether the United
States incurred response costs.' Thus, elements (2) and (3) were not truly
at issue.7" The issue was whether Fleet was an "owner and operator" and
thus liable for the costs of cleaning up such a release under Superfund.7 l
The district court divided its analysis into three parts based upon three
analytically distinct time frames. 2 The time frames involved were first, the
period "immediately before" the tax foreclosure when the property was
conveyed to Emanuel County, Georgia (Period I).' The second time period
began in 1976 when Fleet and SPW entered into the factoring agreement and
lasted until just before Fleet foreclosed its security interest in some of SPW's
inventory and equipment and hired Baldwin to hold the auction (Period II).' 4
Finally, the district court examined the time period beginning when Baldwin
entered the premises to prepare for the June 1982 auction until Nix left the
premises in December 1983 (Period uI).75 The United States sought to
impose liability under Period I based upon Fleet's alleged status as an "owner
and operator of a... facility" under section 9607(a)(1). 76 The United States
asserted basis for liability during Periods II and I was found in section
9607(a)(2), imposing liability on "any
person who at the time of disposal
''
... owned or operated any facility."
The district court had little trouble exculpating Fleet from liability for
their involvement during Period I. The court reached this conclusion because
Fleet did not own or operate the facility immediately before the tax foreclosure.78 The district court specifically found that the "immediately before-

69.
70.
71.
72.
73.

Fleet, 724 F. Supp. at 960.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 960-62.
Id. at 960. This period roughly runs from December 1983 until July 9, 1987,

when the United States filed suit against Fleet. The time periods used in this Comment
are identified as "Period I," etc., for ease in analysis. Neither the district court nor the
court of appeals expressly divided their analyses in this manner. Both courts, however,
examined each of these three discrete time periods separately in light of §§ 9607(a)(1)(2). See infra notes 78-81 and accompanying text for a discussion of the significance
of the activity during Period I.
74. Id. This period runs from 1976- until roughly June 1982, when Baldwin*
conducted the auction.

75. Id.
76. Id. See supra note 19.
77. Id. (emphasis added). See supra note 19.
78. Since title was conveyed to a county government, the following provision in
42 U.S.C. 9601(20XAXiii) (1988) becomes pertinent to the facts of this case. This
provision states in pertinent part, "In the case of any facility, title or control of which
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1991
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hand" language refers to an owner or operator under section 9607(a)(1) just
before the lawsuit is commenced. 79 The district court noted that Fleet's last
involvement with the facility was in December 1983 when Nix completed its
cleanup, which was over three and one-half years prior to the inception of the
lawsuit.' Therefore, the court reasoned, the phrase "immediately beforehand" literally refers to the time period immediately prior to the commencement of the action. Since Fleet had no participation in any management
during this period, Fleet was not, as a matter of law, liable under section
9607(a)(1).8 1
The district court then examined Fleet's activities during Period II and the
liability provision of section 9607(a)(2). The court, with little analysis,
concluded as a matter of law that Fleet had not participated in the management of the facility to a degree sufficient to incur Superfund liability during
Period 11.2 The district court based this conclusion on its finding that a
secured creditor is protected by the secured creditor exemption when the
secured creditor's activities consist merely of
provid[ing] financial assistance and general, and even isolated instances of
specific, management advice to its debtors... if the secured creditor does
not participate in the day-to-day management of the business or facility
either before or after the business ceases operation.83

was conveyed due to... foreclosure, tax delinquency ... to a unit of State of local
government, ... [the owner or operator is] any person who owned, operated or
otherwise controlled the activities at such facility immediately beforehand." Id.
79. Fleet,724 F. Supp. at 960. The Eleventh Circuit agreed with the district court
that owner or operator under § 9607(a)(1) is to be measured at the time the action is
commenced, or where the title is conveyed to a state or local government immediately
before the action is commenced. Fleet, 901 F.2d at 1555.
80. Fleet, 724 F. Supp. at 960.
81. Id.
82. Id. The Eleventh Circuit disagreed with the district court and held that there
were genuine issues of material fact which preclude summary judgment in favor of
Fleet based on Fleet's level of activity during this "second" time period. Fleet, 901
F.2d at 1555. A detailed discussion of the court of appeals reasoning is presented
infra in Section HI of this Comment.
83. Fleet, 724 F. Supp. at 960 (emphasis added). The court cited, by way of
comparison, United States v. Mirabile, 15 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,994,
20,995 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 4, 1985) (a secured party does not participate in the management of a facility and is therefore entitled to rely on the secured creditor exemption
so long as it "does not become overly entangled in the affairs of the actual owner or
operator of a facility").
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol56/iss2/4
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The district court, however, denied Fleet's motion for summary judgment
based upon its finding that genuine issues of material fact remained with
regard to Fleet's activities during Period 111 .84 The allegations of activity on
the part of Fleet contained in the district court opinion indicated that the level
of Fleet's involvement with the facility during this period, if the allegations
were true, certainly increased as evidenced by its foreclosure on some of
SPW's equipment and subsequent sale by Baldwin, Fleet's agent.' Further,
Fleet hired Nix to clean up the premises during this period.8 The district
court, finding that Fleet and the United States disputed the events surrounding
the existence of the handling of the barrels of chemicals and the alleged

asbestos hazard, denied both motions for summary judgment.'
The issue in the case thus became whether Fleet, as a secured creditor,
in fact participated in the management of SPW's facility during Period III.
If so, Fleet lacked the protection of the secured creditor exemption, and
therefore would have been exposed to liability under Superfund. The district
court, finding that no appellate court had addressed the disputed issues
involving Superfund liability,' certified an order for interlocutory appeal
under 28 U.S.C. section 1292.39 The order certified the following questions
which are relevant to this Comment: (1) Whether the district court's
construction of the definition of "owner and operator" was correct, and what
the proper construction of the "secured creditor exemption," including the

84. Fleet, 724 F. Supp. at 961.
85. Id. at 961-62.
86. Id. at 958.
87. Id. The court then ruled on the government's summary judgment motions
against Horowitz and Newton, granting the government's motions with respect to their
liability for the cleanup of the chemicals in the fifty-five gallon drums, but denying the
government's motion with respect to the asbestos cleanup costs. Id. at 962.
88. Id. at 962.
89. Section 1292(b) provides:
When a district judge, in making in a civil action an order not otherwise
appealable under this section, shall be of the opinion that such order
involves a controlling question of law as to which there is substantial
ground for difference of opinion and that an immediate appeal from the
order may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation, he
shall so state in writing in such order. The Court of Appeals which would
have jurisdiction of an appeal of such action may thereupon, in its
discretion, permit an appeal to be taken from such order, if application is
made to it within ten days after the entry of the order: Provided,however,
That application for an appeal hereunder shall not stay proceedings in the
district court unless the district judge or the Court of Appeals or a judge

thereof shall so order.
28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1988) (emphasis added).
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proper "participation in the management" standard is under Superfund?; and
(2) What is the proper construction of the Superfund liability provisions as
they apply to various classes of persons?'

III. THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT'S CONSTRUCTON
OF THE SECURED CREDITOR EXEMPTION
The court of appeals agreed to hear the interlocutory appeal upon Fleet's
motion.91 The court affirmed the district judge's denial of Fleet's motion for
summary judgment based on its finding that genuine issues of material fact
existed as to Fleet's activities from the time SPW ceased operations in
February 1981 until Nix left the facility in December 1983.' Therefore, the
court found Fleet could be liable under section 9607(a)(2)" if it failed to
The central
establish the protection of the secured creditor exemption.'

issue came down to whether Fleet's activities had, from February 1981 until
December 1983, "rise[n] to the level of participation in management sufficient
to impose liability under [Superfund] ...despite the statutory exemption from
liability for holders of a security interest."95
The court of appeals held that a 'secured creditor will be unable to
establish statutory protection under the secured creditor exemption, and thus
will have participated in the management of the facility, when "its involvement with the management of the facility is sufficiently broad to support the
that it could affect hazardous waste disposal decisions if it so
inference
'
chose. 06
The court of appeals divided its analysis between potential liability under
section 9607(a)(1) and liability under section 9607(a)(2)Y Like the district
90. Fleet, 724 F. Supp. at 962. The district court also stayed further proceedings
in the case until either the court of appeals disposed of the interlocutory appeal applied
for by the parties or denied to hear the interlocutory appeal. Id. at 963.
91. Fleet, 901 F.2d at 1552.
92. Id. Note that the appellate court has changed the period within which Fleet
inay be liable. As discussed supra in Section II, the district court found that Fleet
could be liable if certain disputed material facts were proved during Period III (the
period from June 1982 to December 1983). The court of appeals essentially has
redefined Period I to begin in February 1981 running until December 1983. All
further references to Period III in this Comment will adopt the modified court of

appeals time frame.
93. See supra note 19.
94. Fleet, 901 F.2d at 1560.
95. Id. at 1552.
96. Id. at 1558 (emphasis added).
97. See supra note 19 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Superfund
liability provisions.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol56/iss2/4
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court, the Eleventh Circuit examined Fleet's activities according to Periods I,
II and fI.98 The court agreed with the district judge's resolution of the
summary judgment motions, but disagreed on the standard that should be
applied in resolving Fleet's potential liability under the statute. 9
A. Liability under Section 9607(a)(1)
The court made the initial determination that section 9607(a)(1) is
directed toward owners and operators of facilities where hazardous wastes are
found at the time the lawsuit is commenced by filing the complaint.'
Therefore, the court of appeals affirmed the district court's grant of summary
judgment to Fleet on the issue of its liability during Period I.10 The court
noted that the only true dispute on liability during Period I was the meaning
of the term "immediately beforehand" in section 9601(20)(A)(iil).0 2 The
United States contended that the owner immediately beforehand was whoever
had last controlled the facility, regardless of how long ago that control may
have been exercised." The court pointed out that such an interpretation
would require the court to ignore the effective abandonment of the site by the
trustee in bankruptcy. 1' 4 In addition, the court found that no one disputed
Fleet's lack of connection with the facility during Period 1.105 Therefore, it
was a "torture [of] the plain statutory meaning of 'immediately beforehand'"
to impose liability on Fleet for its involvement during Period I. 6 As a

98. See supra note 92 (highlighting the appellate court's modification of the
Period III time frame).
99. Fleet, 901 F.2d at 1558.
100. Id. at 1554. This finding is in agreement with the district court's finding to
the same effect. Fleet, 724 F. Supp. at 960.
101. Fleet, 901 F.2d at 1554.
102. See supra note 78 and accompanying text for the text of § 9601(20)(A)(iii)
and reasoning behind the district court's analysis.
103. Fleet, 901 F.2d at 1555.

104. Id. The court noted that "[a]lthough a trustee can obviously abdicate its
control over a bankrupt estate, it cannot in such a manner unilaterally delegate its
responsibility to a previous controlling entity." Id.
105. Id.
106. Id. The court concluded their analysis with a footnote to support its
interpretation of the immediately beforehand language. The court stated:
This interpretation of § 9607(a)(1) is particularly appropriate in the
context of the entire statutory scheme. While § 9607(a)(1) targets present
owners and operators of toxic waste facilities, § 9607(a)(2) focuses on the
entities that owned or operated the facility at the time the wastes were
disposed. A narrow reading of this section would not, therefore, create an
unintended loophole for individuals or entities to escape liability for
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1991
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result, the court affirmed the district court's grant of Fleet's summary
judgment motion under section 9607(a)(1). 1 7
B. Liability Under Section 9607(a)(2)
Since the appellate court concluded that Fleet could not be liable for their
activities during Period I, Fleet's exposure to liability, if any, occurred by
virtue of its activities during Periods II or Ill. The district court had found,
as a matter of law, that Fleet's participation in SPW's management was purely
financial during Period H, and as such, could not give rise to liability under
Superfund. 8 It is at this point in the analysis that the district court and the
court of appeals disagreed on the interpretation of the secured creditor
exemption. 1 9
The court first noted that Fleet, the secured creditor, had the burden to
establish that it was entitled to rely upon the secured creditor exemption.1
More significantly, the court found that Fleet's indicia of ownership were
"held primarily to protect its security interest in the facility.""' This finding
by the court of appeals is very significant, since one of the two most
important cases that had construed the secured creditor exemption before the
Fleet decision had found the purpose for which the secured party participates
in a facility's management an important factor in determining whether the
lender had acted "primarily to protect its security interest," thereby falling
within the secured creditor exemption." 2 Based upon these findings, and
after noting that no appellate court previously had construed the secured

creditor exemption under Superfund, the court of appeals briefly summarized

improperly disposing hazardous waste.
Id. n.5.
107. Fleet, 901 F.2d at 1560.
108. See Section H,supra, for a discussion of the district court's reasoning.
109. See supra notes 26-27.
110. Fleet, 901 F.2d at 1555-56 (citing United States v. First City Nat'l Bank, 386
U.S. 361, 366 (1967); Maryland Bank & Trust, 632 F. Supp. at 578) (stating that

"where one claims the benefits of an exception to the prohibition of a statute", that
party carries the burden of proof to establish that the exception applies).
111. Fleet, 901 F.2d at 1556.

112. Mirabile, 15 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,994, 20,996. The Mirabile
court noted that it was irrelevant if the bank involved in that case actually owned the
facility by virtue of its purchase at a foreclosure sale. The court nevertheless found
the bank fell within the secured creditor exemption since "its actions with respect to
the foreclosure were undertaken plainly in an effort to protect its security interest in
the property." Id. The Mirabile case is discussed in greater detail in Section IV,
infra.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol56/iss2/4
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the positions of each party on the issue and proceeded to analyze the issues
presented in light of these positions." 3
The United States contended that the proper construction of the
exemption would hold every secured creditor liable for response costs under
Superfund if the secured creditor "participates in any manner in the management of a facility."" 4 The court declined to adopt such a broad construction, noting that lenders often have some involvement in their debtor's
businesses to insure that their interests are protected, and that such a broad
construction would impose Superfund liability on lenders for engaging in their
"normal course" of business.1i
The court also declined to adopt Fleet's proposed construction of the
Fleet suggested that the standard for participating in the
exemption.
management of a facility, and thus removing the secured creditor from the
secured creditor exemption, should be that which was adopted by the court in
United States v. Mirabile.16 The Mirabile court's standard requires the
secured lender to, "at a minimum, participate in the day-to-day operational
aspects of the site" before liability will ensue." 7 The court of appeals, in
discussing the Mirabile standard, described it as one which distinguishes
between permissible participation in the financial management of the facility
versus impermissible participation in the day-to-day operations of the
facility."' After noting that the district court essentially had adopted the
Mirabile standard, the court concluded that this construction of the secured
creditor exemption was "too permissive towards secured creditors who are
involved with toxic waste facilities."" 9
As a result, the court of appeals held that Fleet might have been liable
not only for its activities during Period Ill," 2° as found by the district court,

113. Fleet, 901 F.2d at 1556.
114. Id. (emphasis added).
115. Id.
116. See supra note 83.
117. Mirabile, 15 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) at 20,996 (emphasis added).
118. Fleet, 901 F.2d at 1556 (emphasis added). The court noted that at least four
other district courts had followed the Mirabile court's requirement that the secured
creditor participate in the day-to-day operational aspects of the facility before it will
deny itself the protection of the secured creditor exemption. See United States v. New
Castle County, 727 F. Supp. 854, 866 (D. Del. 1989); United States v. Nicolet, Inc.,
712 F. Supp. 1193, 1204-05 (E.D. Pa. 1989); Rockwell Int'l Corp. v. IU Int'l Corp.,
702 F. Supp. 1384, 1390 (N.D. IM.1988); and Coastal Casing Serv. v. Aron, No. H86-4463 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 8, 1988).
119. Fleet, 901 F.2d at 1557.
120. As discussed in Section H, this period includes the time -during which
Baldwin prepared for and conducted its auction, in June 1982, until Nix left the
premises in December of 1983.
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but also for its activities during a portion of Period 11.121 The court's first
reason for narrowing the availability of the secured creditor exemption
stemmed from its view of the policy considerations underlying Superfund.
The court noted that Superfund has an "overwhelmingly remedial"" goal,
and further expressed its view that ambiguous statutory terms are to be
construed to favor liability in order to carry out this remedial purpose.'2
The court then criticized the district court's test because, in its view, the
district court's construction would render meaningless the secured creditor

exemption.124 The court looked to the overall liability scheme under section
9607(a) coupled with the language of the exemption found in section
9601(20)(A).
It noted that "[i]ndividuals and entities involved in the
operations of a facility are already liable as operators under the express
language of section 9607(a)(2).""u Thus, the court reasoned that whenever
a secured creditor participates in the day-to-day management of the facility,
they are acting as operators and are therefore already liable under
Superfund.1 Based on this premise, the court reasoned that if the district
court's construction of the exemption were correct, there is no reason for its
existence.'

121. Fleet, 901 F.2d at 1560. As discussed under Section II,Period II,as defined
by the district court, encompassed the period from the time Fleet first acquired its
security interest until Baldwin entered the facility to conduct the auction of the
equipment foreclosed upon by Fleet. The time frame covered by Period III was
expanded by the court of appeals. See supra note 92.
122. Florida Power &Light Co. v. Allis Chalmers Corp., 893 F.2d 1313,1316-17
(11th Cir. 1990); United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chem. Co., 810 F.2d
726, 733 (8th Cir. 1986), cerL denied, 484 U.S. 848 (1987).
123. Fleet, 901 F.2d at 1557.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id. Yet that fact makes the district court's standard, first adopted by the
Mirabile court, all the more sensible. There is little disagreement that one whose
participation has risen to the level of an operator can be liable no matter how their
relationship with the facility began. It appears to be a more fair reading of the secured
creditor exemption that it was not designed to protect de facto operators, but was
instead designed to protect secured parties who either have "title" to the facility by
virtue of holding a mortgage on the property (in the so-called "title theory" jurisdictions, where the mortgagee holds legal "title" to the mortgaged property until the
underlying obligation is satisfied), or who obtain title to the facility upon foreclosure
of their security interests and subsequent purchase at the foreclosure sale. Under this
reading, the secured creditor exemption still has great importance under the Mirabile
standard. It still will protect secured parties who do not participate in the day-to-day
activities, but who are "owners" in some fashion by virtue of the mortgage they hold,
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol56/iss2/4
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Based on this view, the court adopted its definition of participating in the
management of a facility. It held that a secured creditor will have participated in the management of the facility, thus denying itself the protection of the
secured creditor exemption, when it
participat[es] in the financial management of a facility to a degree
indicating a capacity to influence the corporation's treatment of hazardous
wastes. It is not necessary for the secured creditor to actually involve itself
in the day-to-day operations of the facility in order to be liable-although
such conduct will certainly lead to the loss of the protection of the statutory
exemption. Nor is it necessary for the secured creditor to participate in
management decisions relating to hazardous wastes. Rather, a secured
creditorwill be liable if its involvement with the management of the facility
is sufficiently broad to support the inference that it could affect hazardous
12
waste disposal decisions if it so chose. s
In an apparent effort to ameliorate the harshness of the announced
standard, the court outlined some general parameters within which a secured
creditor could still operate and avoid liability. For example, it noted that a
secured creditor could still safely monitor any aspect of the debtor's
business. 129 Further, a secured creditor could still involve itself in "occa-

or once held and have now foreclosed upon. See G. NELSON & D. WHITMAN, REAL
ESTATE FINANCE LAw 142-49 (2d ed. 1985) (discussing the title and lien theory of
mortgages).
128. Fleet, 901 F.2d at 1557-58 (emphasis added). In a footnote, the court cited
provisions from the legislative history of CERCLA that the court viewed as supporting
its narrow construction of the secured creditor exemption. Id. at 1558 n.11. The court
noted that the original version of CERCLA had no secured creditor exemption at all.
Id. (citation omitted). The court also reprinted the remarks of Representative Harsha,
who introduced the secured creditor exemption to the bill that became CERCLA.
Representative Harsha stated:
This change is necessary because the original definition inadvertently
subjected those who hold title to a... facility, but do not participate in the
management or operation and are not otherwise affiliated with the person
leasing or operating the... facility, to the liability provisions of the bill.
2 Senate Comm. on Environmental and Public Works, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 A
LegislativeHistory of the CERCLA 945 (Comm. Print 1983) (emphasis in original).
The Court relied on the "not otherwise affiliated" language to conclude that the
secured creditor exemption is to be narrowly construed, and that a standard allowing
participation up to day-to-day operational participation is inconsistent with the history
behind the exemption. Fleet, 901 F.2d at 1558 n.11.
129. Fleet, 901 F.2d at 1558.
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sional and discrete financial decisions relating to the protection of its security
interest without incurring liability."'"
Further, the Eleventh Circuit challenged those who might contend that its
construction of the exemption would deter financial institutions from dealing
with businesses with potential hazardous waste problems."1 The court
instead felt that its ruling would cause lenders to be more thorough in their
pre-loan investigations of potential debtors, and if potential hazardous waste
problems exist, the lender would simply figure such risks into the terms of its
loan agreements, thus realizing exactly what they bargained for when making
the loan." 2 In addition, it reasoned, lenders would insist that their borrowers be environmentally responsible as a condition to present and future
financial support." 3 The court felt that such insistence would promote early
action to resolve hazardous waste problems by forcing borrowers to clean up
or prevent the existence of such sites in order to obtain adequate financing to
operate their businesses.T
Applying its newly announced standard to the facts of the case, the court
found that Fleet could be liable for its participation in Fleet's affairs during
Period III. 5 In conducting its analysis, the court focused on several areas
where Fleet required SPW to get its approval before SPW could take any
action. The court listed the alleged liability exposing activities as follows:
Fleet required SPW to seek its approval before shipping its goods to
customers, established the price for excess inventory, dictated when and to
whom the finished goods should be shipped, determined when employees
should be laid off, supervised the activity of the office administrator at the
site, received and processed SPW's employment and tax forms, controlled
access to the facility, and contracted with Baldwin to dispose of the fixtures
and equipment at SPW." 6
These activities were described by the court as "pervasive, if not
complete." 37 Finally, the court again noted that it is irrelevant to its

130.
131.
132.
133.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

134. Id. at 1558-59.
135. Id. at 1559.

136. Id.
137. Id. The court stated in a footnote:
Generally, the lender's capacity to influence a debtor facility's treatment of
hazardous waste will be inferred from the extent of its involvement in the
facility's financial management. Here, that inference is not even necessary
because there was evidence before the district court that Fleet actively
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol56/iss2/4
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analysis that all of these activities, and the actions taken by Fleet to hire
Baldwin and Nix, may have been taken primarily in an effort by Fleet to
protect its security interest.' The court of appeals then remanded the case
for consideration of the disputed facts in light of the newly announced
"participation in the management" standard after finding that Fleet could be
liable under section 9607(a)(2).

IV. LEGAL ANALYSIS
A. CurrentJudiciallyRecognized
ParticipationStandards
The Fleet court is the only circuit court to enunciate a participation in the
management standard for Superfund's secured' creditor exemption.3 9
Further, while lender liability under Superfund has been confronted by several
district courts, 14° only the courts in United States v. Mirabile and the Fleet

court have addressed specifically the question presented in this case: What
constitutes participation in the management of a facility such that a lender,
who holds a security interest in a debtor's real property or equipment,
inventory and other property (the debtor's facility), will incur Superfund
liability as an owner or operator of the facility?14' A brief review of the
Mirabile standard, and the standard announced by the Fleet court follows.
Since one circuit has already indicated in dictum that it may be unwilling to

asserted its control over the disposal of hazardous wastes at the site by
prohibiting SPW from selling several barrels of chemicals to potential
buyers. As a result, the barrels remained at the facility unattended until the
EPA acted to remove the contaminants.
Id. n.13.
138. Id. at 1560. See supra note 112, discussing another court's view that the
purpose behind taking such actions is relevant to the analysis of determining whether
the secured creditor exemption applies.
139. Fleet, 901 F.2d at 1556.
140. See supra note 118 for a listing of cases cited by the Fleet court which have
discussed the participation standard. See also Guidice v. BFG Electroplating and
Mfg. Co., Inc., 732 F. Supp. 556, 561 (W.D. Pa. 1989) (citing Mirabile, 15 Envtl. L.
Rep. (Envtl. L Inst.) 20,994, 20,995 (E.D. Pa. 1985); Nicolet, 712 F. Supp. at 1204
and Fleet, 724 F. Supp. at 960, as authority for the current judicial definition of
"participating in the management of a facility"); In re T.P. Long Chemical, Inc. 45
B.R. 278, 289 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1985).
141. The court in Nicolet, 712 F. Supp. at 1204-05, reached this issue, but
completely relied upon Mirabile and Fleet in concluding that "only if a mortgagee
participated in the operational aspects of the facility" can it be liable as an owner or
operator due to its participation.
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*follow the Fleet test,142 it is important to understand both the Fleet test, and
the Mirabile standard, which has received considerable support among other
district courts.
Under the Mirabilestandard, a secured party will have participated in the
management of a facility only when it has "participate[d] in the day-to-day
operational aspects of the site."' Application of this standard broadens the
statutory secured creditor exemption by allowing secured parties to engage in
considerable financial participation with the facility's management without
incurring Superfund liability.'" For example, in Mirabile, the court noted
that the lender had secured the property against vandalism by actually
boarding up windows and changing locks. 45 Further, the lender's loan
officer inquired about the cost of disposal of drums containing hazardous
wastes, and visited the site several times to show the property to prospective
purchasers.' 46 In describing the lender's activities, the Mirabile court noted
that the steps taken by the lender were "plainly undertaken in an effort to
protect its security interest in the property."1 47 The Mirabile court suggested
that some limit does exist on the secured party's ability to involve itself in the
borrower's management. Specifically, a secured creditor may not "become
overly entangled in the affairs" of the facility. 14 Therefore, a fair reading of

the Mirabile court's interpretation of the secured creditor exemption indicates
that so long as lenders take commonly practiced steps to enable them to
minimize their losses resulting from the default or potential default of the
debtor, Superfund liability will not be incurred.
The court of appeals in Flee4 on the other hand, considerably narrowed
the availability of the secured creditor exemption. After Fleet, a secured
creditor only has to be involved to the extent that a trier of fact could "infer[]
that [the secured creditor] could affect hazardous waste disposal decisions if
it so chose." 149 As discussed supra in Section III of this Comment, the
Fleet court did indicate that a secured creditor may still engage in at least two

142. See supra note 9.
143. Mirabile, 15 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) at 20,996.
144. Id. at 20,995 (distinguising between day-to-day operational management and
limited participation in financial decisions is critical).
145. Id. at 20,996.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 20,995. The district court in Fleet essentially announced the same
standard when it stated that secured creditors may "provide financial assistance and
general, and even isolated instances of specific management advice to its debtors... if
the secured creditor does not participate in the day-to-day management of... the
facility." Fleet, 724 F. Supp. at 960.
149. Fleet, 901 F.2d at 1558.
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basic activities: (1) it may monitor the debtor's business; and (2) it may
"become involved in occasional and discrete financial decisions relating to
' 0
the protection of its security interest."'
There are two basic situations which recur and which have been
examined by the courts where a secured creditor may find itself exposed to
Superfund liability. The first situation is illustrated by the Fleet decision. In
this pre-foreclosurecontext, the secured party still holds its security interest
in the facility. Nonetheless, the secured creditor may still incur liability if it
has participated in the management of the facility to a degree sufficient to
remove itself from the protection of the secured creditor exemption. The
second, or post-foreclosuresituation, occurs when the secured party forecloses
on its security interest and, in turn, purchases the facility at the foreclosure
sale. At that point, the security interest ceases to exist, and the secured party
The question in the latter
becomes the titled owner of the facility.1'
situation is whether the secured creditor automatically removes itself from the
protection of the secured creditor exemption when it purchases the facility
outright, or whether it may still find protection in the exemption if the
foreclosure and purchase is done "primarily to protect his security interest."" 2 Fleet was a pre-foreclosure case, #ndl as will be illustrated by the
remainder of this Comment, the Fleet court's reliance on policy considerations
from cases involving post-foreclosure Superfund liability is misplaced.
B. The Pre-Foreclosure- Post-Foreclosure
Distinctionand Its Importance in Determining
Superfund Liability for Lenders

The Fleet court has narrowed the availability of the secured creditor
exemption in a manner that likely will result in increased environmental
iiabilities for secured creditors who hold mortgages on property which is

contaminated or holds the potential for contamination from hazardous wastes.
As discussed infra, this apparent narrowing of the exemption was both unwise

150. Id. (emphasis added). For a detailed discussion of the Fleet holding, see

Section Im of this Comment.
151. 55 AM. JUR. 2D Mortgages § 785 (1971).
152. See 42 U.S.C. § 9601(A)(20) (1988) and supra notes 26-27 for the text of
the secured creditor exemption. See also Section IV(B) for a detailed discussion of
Superfund liability in both the pre-foreclosure and post-foreclosure settings under
Superfund. See Section V of this Comment for a discussion of the EPA's proposed
regulation that would provide some relief to mortgagees who foreclose their security
interests in contaminated properties if the foreclosure is done primarily to protect their
security interest.
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and was probably unnecessary based on the facts of the case before the

court.' 5 If the Fleet court's newly announced reading of the secured
creditor exemption is adopted as the standard for secured creditor liability

under Superfund, such an extension of liability to lenders who hold mortgages
on the contaminated facility, but who merely act to protect their positions as
secured parties, likely will produce the undesirable effect of impeding, rather
than promoting, the underlying goals of the Superfund statute. 154
Further, the Fleet court erred when it asserted that a day-to-day
operational standard would render the secured creditor exemption a nullity.lss In fact, the exemption still accomplishes its original purpose-ensuring
that a secured lender will not incur liability as an owner or operator simply
because it holds a security interest in the facility so long as the secured party
does not participate in the facility's management. The exemption accomplishes this, since a secured creditor, under a "day-to-day activity" standard as was
employed by the Mirabile 6 court, can hold indicia of ownership "primarily
to protect his security interest""u7 without operating the facility, and still
avoid Superfund liability. Under the Fleet court's interpretation of the
exemption, a class of liable individuals who are neither owners nor operators
has been created.5s If such a result had been intended, Congress would not

153. This is not to say the Fleet court reached the wrong disposition on the
summary judgment motions. If the facts alleged by the United States are true, Fleet's
involvement with the SPW facility was indeed very great, and may have well risen to
the level of participation in the day-to-day activities of the facility sufficient to incur
liability under a standard such as the one announced in Mirabile. The problem is that
the court of appeals very possibly reached the right result, but for reasons which are
not grounded in sound policy or in the plain structure of the statute. See supra note
136 and accompanying text for the facts alleged by the United States which indicate
Fleet's participation.
154. These goals include "facilitat[ing] cleanups when hazardous substances are
released into the environment or when a release is threatened... and... hold[ing]
responsible parties liable for the costs of these cleanups." Comment, The Impact of
the 1986 SuperfundAmendments andReauthorizationActon the CommercialLending
Industry: A CriticalAssessment, 41 U. MIAMI L REV. 879, 882-83 (1987) (citing
H.R. REP. No. 253, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 15 (1985), reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 3038).

155. See supra note 127 for an initial criticism of the court's conclusion.
156. See supra note 83.
157. See supra notes 26-27 for the full text of the secured creditor exemption.
158. The Fleet court, citing CERCLA's legislative history, stated that "the
threshold at which a secured creditor becomes liable clearly indicates a more peripheral

degree of involvement with the affairs of a facility than is necessary to be held liable
as an operator." Fleet, 901 F.2d at 1558 n.1. If this is true, then why do the
provisions of § 9607 which impose liability refer to "owners or operators"? See supra,
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol56/iss2/4
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have placed the secured creditor exemption as an exception in section
9601(20)(A), Superfund's definition of owner or operator. The language of
the statute states that "[s]uch person [owner or operator] does not include
' 9
... [secured creditors who don't participate].'
The Fleet court, in an effort to preemptively address those who would
criticize its policy grounds for reaching its decision, stated that "[t]hese
concerns [that Superfund's promotion of proper hazardous waste disposal
practices would be impeded by the Fleet decision] are unfounded. '' "W An
examination of these concerns, as set forth by the Fleet court itself, reveals
that many commentators disagree that these concerns are "unfounded."
Further, and of critical importance, the Fleet court looked at these policy
considerations as they have been examined in post-foreclosure contexts, rather
than the pre-foreclosure situation presented by the facts in Fleet.
The Fleet court recognized the cbncerns of those who would oppose its
narrow construction of the exemption when it stated:
Our interpretation of the exemption may be challenged as [1] creating
disincentives for lenders to extend financial assistance to businesses with
potential hazardous waste problems and [2] encouraging secured creditors
to distance themselves from the management actions, particularly those
related to hazardous wastes, of their debtors.... As a result the improper
treatment of hazardous wastes could be perpetuated rather than resolved.' 6'
In rejecting these concerns, the court extensively cited two law review

articles and United States v. Maryland Bank & Trust Co., 162 both of which
the court contended supported its narrower construction of the secured creditor
exemption, and its resultant broader Superfund liability. 63 It is true that

note 128 for the, full text of the footnote in the Fleet decision setting forth the passage
of legislative history relied on by the court in reaching its conclusion.
159. See supra note 9 (discussing the In re Bergsoe case from the Ninth Circuit,
suggesting that it is clear that at least some actual participation, not some nebulous
power to affect, is required before a secured party can incur CERCLA liability without
actually becoming an operator). In addition, under the Fleet standard, the plain
statutory language of the exemption is stretched beyond its limit, as the court has
interpreted the present tense "participating" to mean that a future, potentialpower to
participate if the lender so chooses, is equivalent to participating in the facility's
management.
160. Fleet, 901 F.2d at 1558.
161. Id. (citation omitted).
162. 632 F. Supp. 573 (D. Md. 1986).
163. Wilsdon, When a Security Becomes a Liability: ClaimsAgainst Lenders in
Hazardous Waste Cleanup, 38 HASTINGS LI. 1261, 1294 (1987); Comment, The
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Wilsdon (one of the two articles upon which the court relied) rejected the
Mirabile standard as it applied to post-foreclosure activities of the secured
party.' 64 Wilsdon stated that "the rule offered by Mirabile should be
rejected as inadequate." 16s Yet, the Fleet court's reliance on the analysis
found in Wilsdon, the Liability of FinancialInstitutions article, and in the
MarylandBank and Trust case is misplaced entirely. The Mirabile court, and

Wilsdon in analyzing Mirabile, both examined fact situations where the
secured lender foreclosed on its security interest in real property and took title
to the facility. Wilsdon clearly was rejecting the Mirabile standard in the
post-foreclosure context, and did not even consider the pre-foreclosure setting
when he stated, "A careful analysis of CERCLA's express and implied
objectives reveals that Congress intended to exempt
security interest holders
'1
only while the security instrument is in force." 6
Likewise, the Maryland Bank & Trust court faced a post-foreclosure
Superfund liability situation where a lender who bought the property at the
foreclosure sale held it for four years!16 No consideration at all was given
to liability premised on participation in the facility's management. Instead,
liability was imposed on this lender because once the lender foreclosed and
took title, it no longer held a security interest, but now was the owner of the
facility in all respects. Wilsdon specifically endorsed the Maryland Bank &
Trust liability standard.'6 This standard, however, had nothing to do with
defining when a secured party will participate in the management of a facility

LiabilityofFinanciallnstitutionsforHazardousWaste CleanupCosts Under CERCLA,
1988 WIs. L. REV. 139, 185 (1988).
164. Wilsdon, supra note 163, at 1296.
165. Id.
166. Id. The only discussion of pre-foreclosure liability under CERCLA in the
Wilsdon article centered around a secured party who may have in fact participated in
the day-to-day operations of the facility. The Mirabile court denied this lender's
motion for summary judgment, finding that even though it had not foreclosed and
taken title to the property, it may nevertheless have participated in the management of
the facility to the point of removing itself from the protection of the secured creditor
exemption. Mirabile, 15 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) at 20,997. The lender who
did not foreclose, but who could still have been subject to liability for its preforeclosure participation, settled with the EPA before a trial on its liability was held.
Wilsdon, supra note 163, at 1279 n.111. Note that despite the Fleet court's
protestations to the contrary, the Mirabile standard does not render meaningless the
secured creditor exemption. The lender just discussed still was exposed potentially to
CERCLA liability through its role as a secured creditor because it may have
participated in the management of the facility and thus became an operator.
167. United States v. Maryland Bank &Trust Co., 632 F. Supp. 573,579 (D. Md.
1986).
168. Wilsdon, supra note 163, at 1286.
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to a degree which removes it from the secured creditor exemption protection.
The MarylandBank& Trust standard simply states that "[t]he security interest
must exist at the time of the clean-up."'6 The decision does not address
what would happen if the lender had still held its security interest. In fact, the
court specifically noted that the "mortgagees also have the options of not
foreclosing and not bidding at the foreclosure sale. Both steps would
apparently insulate the mortgageefrom liability."7 '
It is not at all clear, however, that just because a mortgagee forecloses
that automatic liability should follow. The author of the Liability ofFinancial
Institutionsarticle purports to reject Mirabileas the proper standard of liability
in the post-foreclosure setting by stating, "It seems probable that the Mirabile
court did not consider the public policy implications of its decision [to allow
a mortgagee to foreclose and still fall within the secured creditor exemption]."'' In that same article, however, the author explicitly recognizes that
"[i]t is debatable . . whether the lender's foreclosure of a mortgage...
compels the assumption that the lender has become an owner or operator of
a hazardous waste site and therefore liable for cleanup costs. Foreclosure on
a bad debt can be a logical step for a lender to take."'
The purported
reasons given most often for automatically imposing liability on a foreclosing
mortgagee are illustrated by the facts of the Maryland Bank and Trust case.
Cases such as Mirabile, however, point out that the fears expressed by the
Maryland Bank and Trust court are not always present. A "day-to-day"
participation standard like the one applied in Fleet and in Mirabile can
advance the public policy of insuring cleanup costs will be borne by
responsible parties without allowing windfalls to foreclosing mortgagees. 173
It is nonsensical to compare the Mirabile case, and the activities taken by the
lender to board up the windows to the facility to protect against vandalism, to
the Maryland Bank and Trust case where the foreclosing mortgagee held the
property for four years after foreclosure.174 It is not even a fair reading of
MarylandBank and Trust to say that the court there would impose automatic
liability due to foreclosure. The court stated that "[t]he exclusion (the secured
creditor exemption) does not apply to former mortgagees currently holding
title after purchasing the property at a foreclosure sale, at least when, as here,

169. MarylandBank & Trust, 632 F. Supp. at 579.

170. Id. at 580 n.6.
171. Comment, supra note 163, at 176.
172. Id at 160.
173. See supra notes 143-48 and accompanying text for a review of the
mortgagees post-foreclosure activities which were taken primarily to protect its security
interest.
174. MarylandBank and Trust, 632 F. Supp. at 579.
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the former mortgagee has held title for nearly four years."'75 The Maryland
Bank and Trust court, in a footnote to the just-quoted passage further stated:
Because MB & T has held the property for such an extended period of
time, this Court need not consider the issue of whether a secured party
which purchased the property at a foreclosure sale and thenpromptly resold
it would be precluded from asserting the section 101(20)(A) exemption.
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
recently held that a former mortgagee that purchased the property at a
foreclosure sale and assigned it four months later was exempt from
liability.' 76
Further, the Maryland Bank and Trust court did not reject Mirabile,but
simply stated that it would not apply it to the facts of the case before it since
the mortgagee held the property for such an extended time. This reading of
MarylandBank and Trust is clear when one examines the following statement
of the court: "[Mirabile] pertained to a situation in which the mortgageeturned-owner promptly assigned the property. To the extent to which that
opinion suggests a rule of broader application, this court respectfully
disagrees."' 77 Finally, as discussed infra in Section V of this Comment,
even the EPA's proposed regulations do not impose automatically Superfund
liability on a foreclosing mortgagee, an apparent recognition by the EPA that
to do so would radically alter the process by which secured lenders administer
notes secured by mortgages which are in default.
The Fleet court's extensive reliance on policy considerations enunciated
by commentators such as Wilsdon and the author of the Liability of Financial
Institutions article, and the Maryland Bank & Trust court, even if arguably
persuasive in certainpost-foreclosure settings, have no applicability in the preforeclosure context of the Fleet case. Thus, the Fleet court's foundation on
which it supported its narrow construction of the secured creditor exemption
is questionable at best. The inapplicability to the facts of the Fleet case of
reasoning and policy considerations such as those relied upon in Maryland
Bank & Trust is evident from a closer examination of the facts of Maryland
Bank & Trust itself.
Maryland Bank and Trust (MB & T) accepted a mortgage on the property
of Herschel McLeod, Sr. and Nellie McLeod who operated two garbage
disposal businesses on the land.' 78 The McLeods then conveyed the
property to their son, Mark, who obtained a loan from MB & T and took the

175.
176.
177.
178.

Id.
Id. (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
Id. at 580 (emphasis added).
Id. at 575.
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property subject to the mortgage. 7 9 Mark s6on defaulted, and MB & T
foreclosed and took title to the property.' 80 Before this foreclosure, hazardous wastes were dumped on the site. 18' After being notified by Mark that
the site contained hazardous wastes,"u the County Department of Health
notified the EPA of the problem.113 The EPA then notified MB & T and
gave it approximately four months to clean up the site, or else the EPA would
use its own funds to complete the cleanup.'" MB & T refused to clean up
the site, so the EPA completed the cleanup and sued to recover its costs after
MB & T refused to pay. 1"
The primary reason the Maryland Bank & Trust court concluded that a
lender who forecloses and takes title to the property cannot rely on the
secured creditor exemption was stated by the court as follows:
Under the scenario put forward by the bank, the federal government alone
would shoulder the cost of cleaning up the site, while the former mortgagee-turned-owner, would benefit from the clean-up by the increased value of
the now unpolluted land. At the foreclosure sale, the mortgagee could
acquire the property cheaply. All other prospective purchasers would be
faced with potential CERCLA liability, and would shy away from the sale.
Yet once the property had been cleared at the taxpayer's expense and
becomes marketable, the mortgagee-turned-owner would be in a position to
sell the site at a profit. 18

The concerns of the MarylandBank & Trust court are well founded, but
do not exist similarly in a pre-foreclosure setting as existed in Fleet. As long
as the lender holds his security interest, it is the owner/mortgagor of the
property, and not the lender, who benefits from a cleanup of the site. If the
borrower still defaults, the increase in property value still directly accrues to
the owner, not the lender. If the lender forecloses at this point, it will
presumably have to pay an increased price for the land since it is now more
valuable as a result of the cleanup. The increased price may also relieve the
debtor from all or part of any potential liability for a deficiency judgment.
It is true that the security itself, the property, is enhanced by the cleanup,
thus leaving the lender with a better opportunity if he does foreclose to
recover the outstanding indebtedness since the security is now worth more.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. This notification was not given until after MB & T had purchased the site.
183. Id.
184. Id.

185. Id. at 576-77.
186. Id. at 580.
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A lender often will, however, loan working capital in a manner similar to the
factoring arrangement in Fleet in exchange for a security interest in receivables, equipment and the real property. In many of these cases, the receivables and equipment alone have sufficient value to cover the outstanding
indebtedness. Apparently, Fleet Factors Corporation did recover its loan from
SPW since Fleet could have, but never did, foreclose on its security interest
in the plant had SPW still owed Fleet Factors Corp. on the debt. 18 7 In such
a case, it would not matter t6 the lender if the land value is increased by the
cleanup activities or not, since the indebtedness is already satisfied without
regard to the real property value. Even if the lender could benefit from the
enhanced value of the real property, the Fleet court's "inference" that the
lender "could" affect hazardous waste disposal practices will send lenders to
their lawyers before making any loans which may lead to Superfund liability.
Undoubtedly, prudent lenders' attorneys will advise the lender to stay away
from such loans when the standard for liability is defined so nebulously as to
provide lenders with little guidance in conducting their lending activities with
borrowers who present such environmental risks.
C. Policy ConsiderationsDo Not Support the Fleet
Court's Standard in the Pre-ForeclosureContext
The Fleet court cited two main policy considerations which purported to
support its newly announced participation standard. The first of these was the
policy of encouraging lenders "to investigate thoroughly the waste treatment
systems and policies of potential debtors."'l The court felt that the lender
could simply investigate the potential risk of Superfund liability and factor
those risks into its loan terms. 8 9 In turn, the second consideration would
be advanced; borrowers would be given incentives to properly handle their
hazardous wastes since such borrowers will be unable to obtain needed funds
if lenders face high potential environmental liabilities.'90 The court's
argument makes two critical assumptions, neither of which consider the
realities of the commercial lending industry.
First, the court assumes that lenders will continue to loan to borrowers
who present a risk of Superfund liability. Second, even if lenders do continue

187. It is unlikely that Fleet intentionally chose not to foreclose on its security
interest in the plant for fear of CERCLA liability because cases such as Mirabile and
Maryland Bank & Trust were not decided until 1985-86. Recall that Fleet's last
involvement with the SPW facility was in 1983. Research revealed no cases imposing
liability on lenders under CERCLA during that period.
188: Fleet, 901 F.2d at 1558.
189. Id.
190. Id.
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to loan money in these instances, the borrower may be unable to afford the
cost of funds the bank must charge to cover its potential Superfund liability.
There is little question that lenders could play a positive role in
effectuating hazardous waste cleanup, but that role can only be carried out
effectively if the lender is free to assist the debtor in solving its hazardous
waste problems. For example, one commentator points out that lenders could,
and in fact already do, require environmental audits and safer hazardous waste
disposal practices as a condition to lending money to borrowers who engage
in such activities.'
While acknowledging such lender involvement,
however, the author warns that "if lenders are unable to predict the scope of
potential liability they may incur as constructive operators of the site, they will
refrain from aiding borrowers; moreover, they may simply choose not to
,
lend."9
Those lenders who commonly have imposed such requirements on their
borrowers do so for reasons that are not entirely dependent on the potential for
lender liability under Superfund. As one commentator stated, "Banks and
other creditors must have both an incentive and security when loaning money.
The incentive is the ability to make a profit from the loan or extension of
credit. The security is the collateral. Without incentive, loans will not be
made and credit will not be extended."'93
When loans are made and liens are created on property to secure those
loans, the lender will only remain secured if the property value remains
sufficient to cover the outstanding balance of the loan. Without a doubt,
properties found to be contaminated with hazardous wastes drop dramatically
in value, resulting in increased loan-to-value ratios. Lenders who once had
a relatively "safe" loan now face greatly increased risks of losses on the loan.
Thus, lenders have tried to use environmental audits and the like to insure that

waste contamination does not occur. If such problems are prevented, the
lender remains secured and the threat to society from hazardous waste sites
is lessened.
However, the nebulous and indefinable standard of the Fleet court will

actually hinder rather than promote such preemptive hazardous waste
management and disposal. The huge potential environmental liabilities will
often reduce the profit potential of making loans to such a degree that lenders
simply will choose not to lend. The Fleet court states that "such environmental issues can be weighed into the terms of the loan agreement."' 94 Yet, this
statement is true only if loan agreements exist in the first instance. When

191. Note, InterpretingtheMeaning ofLender ManagementParticipationUnder
Section 101 (20)(A) of CERCLA, 98 YALE L.J. 925, 927 (1989).
192. Id. at 927-28. (citation omitted).
193. Burcat, supra note 3, at 536 (emphasis added).
194. Fleet, 901 F.2d at 1558.
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such loans are noi made for fear of Superfund liability, the Fleet court's
second goal-that sound waste practices will be promoted-also fails to
materialize. As the author of Lender Management Participation states:
"Without capital, business cannot afford to implement the waste reduction
practices necessary to protect the public health and the environment."195 If
one doubts that lenders may in fact stop lending money in such situations, one
need only look to the recent commentary on the Fleet decision to note that
lenders are taking this decision very seriously.' 96 One commentator, the
head of a New York firm's environmental law group, commented that
until the law is further clarified, financial institutions will shrink from
lending to companies with identified or potential hazardous-waste exposures. If this development in fact occurs, it will undercut a key goal of
Superfund-that private parties conduct clean-ups themselves to the
maximum extent possible.' 97
Therefore, the Fleet court's hopes that lenders will encourage and
monitor hazardous waste practices will not be realized where loans are never
made. Such a result is undesirable because it is well recognized that there is
value in encouraging lenders to become "monitors" of the hazardous waste
disposal practices of their debtors. 98 To do this, however, banks must first
be willing to extend loans to these debtors. Fleet narrows the availability of
the secured creditor exemption to such a degree that a very low level of
participation may render a lender liable for vast environmental liabilities. The
result is not difficult to surmise. Lenders faced with high-risk investments
(loans to companies with potential environmental liabilities) instead will opt
for more conservative investments. Even those lenders who are willing to
lend in such situations will not do so for free. Borrowers will pay whatever
risk premium 199 the lender perceives is necessary to cover these uncertain

195. Id. at 908 (citing U.S. GEN. AccOUNtING OFFICE, HAzARDOus WASTE:
IssuEs SuRRouNDING INsuRANCE AVAILABILITY 31 (Oct. 1987)).

196. Freeman, Recent Case Law May Expand Lender's Risks Under Superfund,
13 NAT'L L. J. 18 (Sept. 17, 1990) ("The broad language of the decision suggest that
there may be virtually no 'safe harbor' for lenders who desire to avoid Superfund
liability .... .").
197. Id. at 20. It certainly is instructive to note that commentators, such as Mr.
Freeman who predict that the Fleet decision will cause lenders to withdraw from
lending in these areas, are attorneys who are practicing in the field and will be
advising lenders. If the practitioners in the field view the Fleet decision as setting a
low threshold of liability, they certainly can be expected to tell their lenders to steer

clear of such loans.
198. Note, supra note 191, at 931.
199. The "risk premium" is defined as "extra interest paid to a lender, over
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potential environmental liabilities. Many debtors may not, however, be able
to afford the increased rates they will have to pay to receive financing. The
result of this narrowing of the secured creditor exemption, and its effect on the
lending practices and borrowing options for borrowers was summarized well
by a commentator who stated:
Under a low liability threshold [like the standard announced in Fleet], the
lender would quickly sever its relationship with a financially distressed
debtor, accelerate loan payments, and try to recover the debt. Under such
a scenario, allpartiesare worse off the debtor cannot afford to dispose of
the wastes properly, the lender may not fully recover the loan, and the
will suffer until the government shoulders the cleanup
environment
°
2

costs.

As a result of the vague standard set down by the Fleet coufrt, lenders now
face a catch-22 situation. On the one hand, if lenders do choose to make
these loans, they could do so only after conducting extensive pre-loan
environmental audits, contractually requiring borrowers to conduct safe waste
The knowledge
practices, and requiring indemnification agreements." °
gained from the audit, and the influence gained from the power to enforce the
covenants gives the government and other plaintiffs a sword to use against the
lender in imposing Superfund liability. To make sure such covenants are not
being violated, the lender will have to monitor further the borrower's
activities. Their "monitoring" activities may be sufficient to support an
inference that they could affect hazardous waste disposal decisions, thus
By imposing
exposing themselves to massive environmental liabilities. 2°
these requirements on their borrowers, the lender is in effect supporting an
inference that they could influence the borrower's hazardous waste disposal
activities.

amounts usually considered normal, in return for their undertaking to engage in
activities [or make loans for such activities] more risky than normal." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 1193 (5th ed. 1979).
200. Note, supra note 191, at 93; see also Leland, Lender Liability in Cleanups
Presents Workout Dilemma, AM. BANKER, June 20, 1990, at 4.
201. Burcat, supra note 3, at 540-41.
202. Backers of a standard such as the one enunciated in Fleet might counter by
saying that the bank could still recover from the borrower by virtue of the loan
covenants and indemnification agreements. Yet how many of these borrowers faced
with these environmental liabilities are going to have any money to indemnify the
lenders? Fleetis a perfect example. Clearly, the owners of the SPW facility are liable
for the cleanup costs. The problem is that SPW is now bankrupt and has no money.
As a result, the EPA went after Fleet Factors Corp.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1991

33

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 56, Iss. 2 [1991], Art. 4
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 56

The other option is equally undesirable for the lender. If the lender does
not take these steps, it blindly will be making loans at a greatly increased risk
of encountering unexpected environmental liabilities. In either case, if the
lender was even willing to make the loan in the first place, the lender may
simply walk away from the entire situation and write off the debt, rather than
face huge environmental liabilities.' °3 If lenders do this, their expert advice
and further financial support in financing cleanups will be lost. Of course, as
discussed earlier, the uncertainty created by the Fleet standard may just
prompt lenders to stay out of this area of lending altogether. Even commentators who reject the narrower standard set forth in Mirabilerecognize that too
broad a sweep of liability for lenders will have an adverse impact on the goals
underlying Superfund. 2 4 The Liability of Financial Institutions author
noted:
[T]he very lenders who could conceivably encourage borrowers to engage
in safer handling and disposal practices could also be dissuaded from
offering hazardous waste disposal advice for fear of later being held liable
for cleanup costs. On the other hand, if courts give a narrower reading to
the term "management," [and thus broaden the availability of the secured
creditor exemption] then lenders can have some influence over. their
borrowers' hazardous waste activities, a5 result which is more beneficial to
the lender, the borrower, and society.
Thus, while this author may have believed that the Mirabilestandard was
inappropriate when a lender actually takes title to the facility, a standard that
sweeps liability as broadly as that enunciated by the Fleet court equally is
undesirable in the pre-foreclosure setting. The Fleetcourt relied on authorities
which it interpreted as suggesting that a narrow reading of the exemption
would encourage safer and more effective hazardous waste disposal activities.
In fact, the authorities lend little support to the court's theory, since they dealt
with the entirely different post-foreclosure setting. The evidence, discerned
from those who will decide whether or not to lend, the lenders themselves and
their attorneys, is clear. Not only will the Fleet standard be "challenged as
creating disincentives for lenders ... result[ing] [in] the improper treatment
of hazardous wastes . . . ,"6 but the uncertainty created by the decision

will, in fact, create such disincentives. Lenders who could promote safe
hazardous waste practices will decline to do so now because of the magnitude
of the potential environmental liability.

203.
204.
205.
206.

See Comment, supra note 163, at 179.
Id.
Id. at 180.
Fleet, 901 F.2d at 1558.
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V. FLEET'S AFrERMATH: A CALL FOR
REFORM IN CONGRESS

To no one's surprise, the lending community reacted to the Fleet decision
with near unanimous condemnation and, undoubtedly, a great deal of concern.
Shortly after the decision was announced, the condemnation began. 20 7
Amicus curiaebriefs filed by several lenders groups contain warnings from the
lenders that loan money will dry up for businesses that pose environmental
risks unless the breadth of Fleet is reduced. 2 s
The EPA, in an effort to clarify the potential scope of liability under
Superfund, has proposed a new set of regulations which interpret the secured
creditor exemption somewhat more broadly than Fleet would suggest.209
The EPA, recognizing the uncertainty and concern created by the Fleet
decision, ° stated that "the mere capacity or ability to influence facility
operations" is not sufficient to rise to the level of participation in the
management of a facility. 1 ' Mr. Strock summarized the heart of the
proposed draft rule when he stated:
In general, a lender is considered to be participating in management within
the meaning of the exemption if, while the boriower is still in possession,
the lender has materially divested the borrowerof debisiohmaking control

over facility operations, particularly
with respect to the hazardous substanc212
es present at the facility.

207. See, e.g., U.S. Asks Supreme CourtNot To Review FleetFactorsRuling on
CERCLA liability, BANKING REP. (BNA) Vol. 55, No. 25, at 1036 (Dec. 24, 1990).
See also Becker, EnvironmentalExposure, THE MAG. OF BANK MGMT., Aug. 1990,

at 34 ([Fleet] may slow the wheels of progress [for lessening Superfund lender
liability] ... ."); Freeman, Recent Case Law May Expand Lender's Risks Under
Superfund, THE NAT'L L J., Sept. 17, 1990, at 18.
208. Widespread Havoc Predicted by ABA, Others Supporting Fleet Factors

Review, BANKING REP. (BNA) Vol. 55, No. 19, at 791 (Nov. 12, 1990) (discussing
briefs filed by the American Bankers Association, the California Bankers Association
and the American College of Real Estate Lawyers).
209. EPA DraftLays Out Lender Liability for Site Cleanup, 59 U.S.L.W. 2225

(Oct. 16, 1990) (discussing a draft of the regulation that the EPA intends to propose
which is currently under review at the Office of Management and Budget (OMB)).
The EPA has said that after the OMB review is complete, it will accept public
comment on the rule for sixty days. Id.
210. Id.

211. Id. (comments of James Strock, EPA's Assistant Administrator for
Enforcement).
212. Id.
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This apparently does not mean that the lender cannot engage in normal
workout activities and may even foreclose in some circumstances.
[A] lender may take actions to protect its interest by policing the loan, by
undertaking financial workout with a borrower where the security interest
is threatened, and by foreclosing and expeditiously liquidating the assets
securing the loan, EPA said. In general, such actions are not considered to
be participation in the management of a facility provided that the actions
taken are necessary to protect the security interest.213
While lenders welcome the proposed rule in some respects, some still
foresee serious problems until further action is taken.214 As evidenced by
Ms. Corash's remarks, the main problem the rule would not solve is how the
lender who forecloses is supposed to "expeditiously" liquidate the property,
if any potential buyer would immediately be subject to owner liability under
Superfund. Further, it is not even certain that the proposed rule will be
adopted at all, or if it is to be adopted, when.
Soon after Fleet, bills were introduced in both the House and Senate
which would reduce lenders' exposure to Superfund liability. Neither bill was
passed during the 101st Congress.215 Congressman Lefalce's bill has as its
express purpose "to limit the liability under [Superfund] of lending institutions
acquiring facilities through foreclosure or similar means. 21 6 The bill would
exclude specifically from Superfund's definition of owner or operator "[a]ny
designated lending institution which acquires ownership or control of the
facility pursuant to the terms of a security interest held by the person in that
'
facility."217
Senator Gan's bill would amend the Federal Deposit Insurance

Act to remove strict liability exposure for lenders and specifically would

require lenders to have had
actual knowledge that a hazardous substance or similar material is used,
stored, of located on property ... [and] failed to take all reasonable actions
necessary to prevent the release or disposal of such substance; or... has

213. Id. (emphasis added).
214. Michele Corash, a partner with Morrison & Foerster in San Francisco, and
the general counsel at the EPA during the Carter administration stated that "[the draft
rule] improves the situation, but it does not solve the problem." Wall Street Journal,
October 11, 1990, at 12, col. 6. Ms. Corash noted that "the regulatory relief that
would be granted lenders who foreclose on a hazardous waste site wouldn't be
extended to entities that buy such sites from the lenders." Id.
215. H.R. 4494, 101st Cong., 2d Sess.(1990); S. 2827, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. §
1101 (1990).
216. H.R. 4494, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990).
217. Id.
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benefitted from removal, remedial or other response action, but only to the
218
extent of the actual benefit conferred by such action on that person.
Both of these bills would broaden considerably the protection given
secured lenders from Superfund liability. It is quite uncertain, however, just
how likely it is that these bills will be adopted by the Congress in substantially their present forms, if at all. Legislative activity such as this apparently
provided, however, at 21
least in part, the catalyst for the EPA's proposal of new
Superfund regulations.
VI. CONCLUSION
Fleet injects a high level of uncertainty and apparently sets the liability
threshold for lenders so low that lenders may now be unwilling to make loans
to companies with potential environmental liabilities. Even if lenders do make
such loans, the Fleet "participation in the management" standard prohibits
lenders from taking the necessary steps to insure both the security for the loan
and to protect themselves from environmental liability. If the lender does not
involve itself with the borrower at all, it risks making loans without full
information and with little control. Thus, the probability of default and losses
is high. If the lender does involve itself in trying to help the debtor succeed,
which in turn insures that the debtor can pay its obligation, the lender faces
the real possibility that a court will infer that it could have influenced the
debtor's hazardous waste practices.
This catch-22 situation leaves the lender in an uncertain and risky
position which will almost certainly cause financing in this area to dry up.
This in turn leaves borrowers who need funds with no place to obtain them.
Further, it leaves society with an environmental mess and high government
costs, since the expertise and financing lenders could provide to clean up
hazardous waste sites will no longer be available.
JAMES B. LOWERY

218. S. 2827, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. § 1101 (1990).
219. "In an effort to hold off legislation pending in the House and Senate that
would tinker with CERCLA's liability language [the EPA proposed the new
regulations] ... ." 59 U.S.L.W. 2225 (1990).
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